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THE SUNSET OF THE HOLOCAUST 
EXPROPRIATED ART RECOVERY ACT OF 2016 
AND THE RISE OF THE DEMAND AND REFUSAL 
RULE 
Fallon S. Sheridan* 
 
During World War II, hundreds of thousands of works of art were 
confiscated by Nazis under the direction of Adolf Hitler or sold for less than 
market value by members of the Jewish community fleeing Nazi Germany.  
Shockingly, an estimated 100,000 of the 600,000 works that were taken are 
still missing today.  In recognition of the need for laws that adequately assist 
original owners (and their heirs) in recovering these works of art, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (“the 
HEAR Act”).  The HEAR Act supplanted state statutes of limitations for Nazi-
confiscated artwork with a national six-year statute of limitations.  A cause 
of action for replevin of Nazi-confiscated artwork under the HEAR Act 
accrues once the original owner has “actual knowledge” of a claim against 
the current possessor.  The HEAR Act contains a sunset provision—causing 
it to expire on January 1, 2027.  Upon expiration, the law applied to cases of 
Nazi-confiscated art recovery will revert to state statutes.  This Note 
examines two state accrual rules for causes of action for replevin of personal 
property—the discovery rule and the demand and refusal rule—and proceeds 
to examine their strengths and weaknesses.  This Note suggests that the 
HEAR Act should be used as a model for states to address the need for 
claimant-friendly accrual rules for causes of action for replevin.  Ultimately, 
this Note argues that upon expiration of the HEAR Act:  (1) states, rather 
than the federal government, should adopt the demand and refusal rule; (2) 
the rule should be applied to all types of stolen chattels, not just Nazi-
confiscated art; (3) demand and refusal should be applied to thieves and bad-
faith purchasers, not just good-faith purchasers; (4) the rule should not be 
applied retroactively to avoid constitutionality concerns; and (5) the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental question posed by the HEAR Act is, have we here in the 
United States done enough to ensure fair and equitable solutions?  I believe 
we have done a great deal, but we still could and should do much more. 
—Ronald S. Lauder1 
 
During the 1930s and amidst World War II, Adolf Hitler’s National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party undertook what was later coined “the 
greatest art theft in history.”2  Hitler’s regime ultimately took an estimated 
600,000 works of art, and the United States has undertaken a number of 
efforts since World War II to repatriate this stolen art.3  These efforts 
culminated in the passage of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act 
of 20164 (“the HEAR Act”), which supplanted state statutes of limitations 
and replaced them with a national six-year statute of limitations for “artwork 
or other property that was lost during the covered period” of January 1, 1933 
to December 31, 1945 “because of Nazi persecution.”5 
Absent the HEAR Act, a cause of action for replevin of a Nazi-confiscated 
work of art would fall under a state’s statute of limitations; the majority of 
state jurisdictions, such as New Jersey, employ the discovery rule,6 while 
New York employs a minority demand and refusal rule.7  Scholars and courts 
disagree over which of these rules better protects stolen artwork.8  Upon the 
HEAR Act’s expiration on January 1, 2027, states will decide whether the 
discovery rule or the demand and refusal rule is the better method to continue 
to protect and repatriate stolen works of art.9 
 
 1. The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their Lost 
Heritage:  Hearing on S. 2763 Before the Subcomms. On the Const., Oversight, Agency 
Action, Fed. Rts. & Fed. Cts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) 
[hereinafter HEAR Act Hearing] (statement of Ambassador Ronald S. Lauder, Chairman of 
the Council, World Jewish Restitution Organization). 
 2. Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, Note, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016:  
An Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (quoting 
Alex Shoumatoff, The Devil and the Art Dealer, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 19, 2014), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/04/degenerate-art-cornelius-gurlitt-munich-
apartment [https://perma.cc/C8E8-TZVN]); see also Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery 
Act of 2016 § 2(1), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note (calling this time period the “greatest displacement 
of art in human history”). 
 3. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Opinion, Art Stolen by the Nazis Is Still Missing.  Here’s How We 
Can Recover It., WASH. POST. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-
one-should-trade-in-or-possess-art-stolen-by-the-nazis/2019/01/02/01990232-0ed3-11e9-
831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html [https://perma.cc/97N5-KBKF].  For a discussion of efforts 
by the United States to repatriate Nazi-confiscated art, see infra notes 27–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 4. Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1524 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note). 
 5. Id. § 5(a), 130 Stat. at 1526. 
 6. See generally O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980). 
 7. See generally Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 
1991). 
 8. See infra Parts I.D–E. 
 9. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(g). 
2844 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
This Note argues that the expiration of the HEAR Act should be the 
impetus for placing the issue of discovery versus demand and refusal on 
states’ agendas.  This Note further argues that the HEAR Act’s sympathy for 
claimants and emphasis on owner protection should be used as a model to 
apply the demand and refusal rule to all cases of stolen chattels. 
Part I discusses the circumstances and historical context behind Nazi-
confiscated art and its present implications.  Part I also introduces the 
purposes ascribed to causes of action for replevin and statutes of limitations.  
From there, Part I discusses three rules for accrual of a cause of action for 
replevin:  (1) accrual at the time of the theft, (2) the discovery rule, and (3) 
the demand and refusal rule.  Part I then provides a general overview of the 
HEAR Act.  Part II discusses arguments advanced by scholars and judges for 
and against the two more modern accrual rules:  the discovery rule and the 
demand and refusal rule. 
Part III argues that upon expiration of the HEAR Act, states should 
reevaluate their statutes of limitations for causes of action for replevin of 
stolen chattels.  This Note suggests state legislatures adopt the demand and 
refusal rule and provides a number of considerations for that future 
legislation:  (1) state rather than federal implementation of the demand and 
refusal rule; (2) application of the demand and refusal rule to all stolen 
chattels, not just Nazi-confiscated art; (3) application of demand and refusal 
to thieves and bad-faith purchasers; (4) nonretroactivity of newly 
implemented demand and refusal rules; and (5) a shortening of the durations 
of statutes of limitations for causes of action for replevin upon implementing 
demand and refusal. 
I.  NAZI-CONFISCATED ART AND THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
Part I.A discusses the historical context of Nazi-confiscated art to provide 
the basis for understanding the HEAR Act.  Part I.B explains causes of action 
for replevin and the purposes underlying statutes of limitations generally.  
Parts I.C–E explain three accrual rules for statutes of limitations for causes 
of action for replevin:  accrual from the time of the theft; the discovery rule; 
and the demand and refusal rule.  The latter two of these rules are the focus 
of this Note.10  Part I.F details the structure and contents of the HEAR Act, 
as well as the applicability of the doctrine of laches to cases under the HEAR 
Act. 
 
 10. Although outside the scope of this Note, some states, such as California, have 
variations on these rules. See Tarquin Preziosi, Applying a Strict Discovery Rule to Art Stolen 
in the Past, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 225, 247–48 (1997).  Preziosi identifies other laudable 
suggestions besides these accrual rules:  “Legislation that requires victims of art theft to 
register their stolen works and/or that requires purchasers to do a title search in order to 
preserve their rights is desirable.” Id. at 252.  However, J. Christian Kennedy has stated that 
the U.S. government “does not have any leverage to force compliance” with registration and 
museum disclosure programs. J. Christian Kennedy, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, The Role of the United States Government in Art Restitution (Apr. 23, 2007), 
https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/83392.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4RA-K9FS]. 
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A.  The Greatest Art Theft in History 
Under Hitler’s oppression, Jewish property, including art, was often seized 
by Nazis or sold for less than market value by members of the Jewish 
community forced to flee Nazi Germany.11  Hitler’s anti-art agenda was in 
large part motivated by his obsession with cultural cleansing—a cleansing he 
felt could be accomplished by “merciless war” against “cultural 
disintegration.”12  Inspired by Max Nordau’s Entartung (Degeneration),13 
Hitler called for the eradication of all nonrepresentational art.14  Hitler’s 
“degenerate artists” cleanse extended to painters, such as Vincent van Gogh, 
Paul Cézanne, and Henri Matisse; filmmakers, such as Fritz Lang and Billy 
Wilder; and writers, such as Franz Kafka, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, and 
Bertolt Brecht.15 
Under Hitler’s direction, “degenerate art” exhibitions were held to “reveal 
the philosophical, political, racial and moral goals and intentions behind this 
movement, and the driving forces of corruption which follow them.”16  For 
example, minister of public enlightenment and propaganda, Joseph 
Goebbels, established an art confiscation commission in 1937.17  The 
confiscated art was collected and displayed at the “Degenerate Art Show” in 
Munich.18  A pamphlet created for the art show and circulated by the Ministry 
of Science, Education, and Culture stated:  “Dadaism, Futurism, Cubism, and 
the other isms are the poisonous flower of a Jewish parasitical plant, grown 
on German soil. . . .  Examples of these will be the strongest proof for the 
necessity of a radical solution to the Jewish question.”19 
 
 11. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2019); 
Alex Shoumatoff, The Devil and the Art Dealer, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 19, 2014), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/04/degenerate-art-cornelius-gurlitt-munich-
apartment [https://perma.cc/C8E8-TZVN].  For example, Jewish art dealer, Alfred 
Flechtheim, who owned multiple modern art galleries, “fled to Paris and then London, leaving 
behind his collection of art.  He died impoverished in 1937.  His family has been trying to 
reclaim the collection, including The Lion Tamer for years.” Shoumatoff, supra.  Cornelius 
Gurlitt, who sold Max Beckmann’s The Lion Tamer to the Lempertz Auction House in 2011 
for $1.17 million, entered into a settlement agreement with the Flechtheim estate, in which 
“Gurlitt acknowledged that the Beckmann had been sold under duress by Flechtheim in 1934 
to his father, Hildebrand Gurlitt.” Id. 
 12. Shoumatoff, supra note 11. 
 13. MAX SIMON NORDAU, DEGENERATION (trans., London, William Heinemann 1898). 
Nordau’s Entartung “postulated that some of the new art and literature that was appearing in 
fin de siècle Europe was the product of diseased minds.” Shoumatoff, supra note 11.  
Ironically, while Hitler’s anti-Semitic agenda was inspired by Nordau’s writing, Nordau 
himself viewed anti-Semitic sentiments as “alarming . . . a point that seems to have been lost 
on Hitler.” Id. 
 14. Id.  Nonrepresentational art can summarily be defined as “anything that deviate[s] 
from classic representationalism . . . [e.g.,] new Expressionism, Cubism, Dadaism, Fauvism, 
futurism . . . objective realism . . . Impressionism” and abstractism. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Lucy Burns, Degenerate Art:  Why Hitler Hated Modernism, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24819441 [https://perma.cc/W6G3-HEZ5]; see 
also Shoumatoff, supra note 11. 
 17. Shoumatoff, supra note 11. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (alteration in original). 
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While there is a need to return these Nazi-confiscated works of art back to 
their original owners (or their heirs),20 an estimated 100,000 works of art—
that is, approximately one-sixth of the works stolen—have yet to be 
recovered.21  Problems associated with Nazi-confiscated art restitution 
include:  that many heirs of deceased owners are unaware, or have no means 
of tracking, what works have been lost,22 and some countries, such as 
Germany, have “no law preventing an individual or an institution from 
owning looted art.”23  A lost art website established by the German 
government only displayed 458 works as of 201424—a bare-bones 
representation of the 100,000 works that are still missing.  Most shockingly, 
as of 2014, the German law permitting the Nazi’s confiscation of 
“Degenerate Art” had yet to be repealed.25  Lastly, the cost of litigation for 
art restitution can be very high.26 
The U.S. government has undertaken a number of efforts to address Nazi-
confiscated art.  These efforts have included convening The Washington 
Conference on Holocaust Era Assets in 1998 and creating the Principles on 
Nazi-Confiscated Art;27 enacting the Holocaust Victims Redress Act;28 and 
participating in the Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference in 2009, which 
 
 20. See id. 
 21. Eizenstat, supra note 3. 
 22. Contra Preziosi, supra note 10, at 250 n.206.  “The problems of proving ownership to 
art lost during and before World War II are not necessarily as daunting as they seem; the Nazis 
often left accurate records of what they took and where it was taken from.” Id. 
 23. Shoumatoff, supra note 11. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Emily J. Henson, Comment, The Last Prisoners of War:  Returning World War II 
Art to Its Rightful Owners—Can Moral Obligations Be Translated into Legal Duties?, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1103, 1147 (2002). 
 27. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(3), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note.  
The Washington Conference established eleven nonbinding principles, to be recognized by 
participating countries. Off. of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art (Dec. 3, 1998), 
https://www.state.gov/washington-conference-principles-on-nazi-confiscated-art/ 
[https://perma.cc/D5F8-7TGH].  These principles are:  (1) identifying Nazi-confiscated 
artwork; (2) making records and archives available to researchers; (3) making identification 
resources available; (4) recognizing that provenances of Nazi-confiscated artwork are not 
easily discoverable; (5) promoting publication of identified Nazi-confiscated art; (6) creating 
a central registry of Nazi-confiscated art; (7) encouraging original owners to make claims for 
their artwork; (8) creating “just and fair solution[s]” for identified, original owners and heirs 
of Nazi-confiscated artwork, using fact-specific considerations; (9) taking “steps . . . 
expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution” for unidentified, original owners and heirs; 
(10) creating commissions to identify Nazi-confiscated art and “address[] ownership issues”; 
and (11) creating and implementing procedures in participating countries to effectuate these 
principles, especially alternative dispute resolution procedures. See id. 
 28. Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15 (1998).  The Holocaust Victims Redress Act 
addresses Nazi-confiscated art by stating:  “It is the sense of Congress that . . . governments 
should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of . . . works of art[] to the rightful 
owners in cases where assets were confiscated from the claimant during the period of Nazi 
rule . . . .” Id. § 202, 112 Stat. at 16–17.  The Holocaust Victims Redress Act is highlighted in 
the HEAR Act. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(4). 
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issued the Terezin Declaration.29  Nonetheless, lawsuits commenced by 
victims of Nazi art confiscation “face significant procedural obstacles partly 
due to State statutes of limitations, which typically bar claims within some 
limited number of years from either the date of the loss or the date that the 
claim should have been discovered.”30  Furthermore, in Von Saher v. Norton 
Simon Museum of Art31 (Von Saher I), the Ninth Circuit held that state 
exceptions to statutes of limitations for Nazi-confiscated art are 
unconstitutional as violative of the federal foreign affairs power.  Congress 
seemed to underwrite that decision by positively citing Von Saher I in the 
HEAR Act.32  Specifically, Congress stated that “[i]n light of [Von Saher I], 
the enactment of a Federal law is necessary to ensure that claims to Nazi-
confiscated art are adjudicated in accordance with United States policy.”33 
B.  Restitution and Restrictions:  Causes of Action for Replevin and the 
Purposes of Statutes of Limitations 
When a chattel,34 such as a work of art, has been stolen and resold to a 
good-faith purchaser, the original owner has a cause of action for replevin.35  
Replevin is a “lawsuit to repossess personal property wrongfully taken or 
detained by the defendant, whereby the plaintiff gives security for and holds 
the property until the court decides who owns it.”36 
Rules regarding replevin, including those rules regarding statutes of 
limitations,37 differ by jurisdiction.38  Therefore, decisions about the length 
of the statute of limitations and when it starts to run are up to states. 
Statutes of limitations serve the purpose of ensuring that claims are 
brought in a timely fashion, so that meritorious claims can be evaluated based 
 
 29. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(5).  The Terezin 
Declaration urged participating countries to make “[e]very effort . . . to rectify the 
consequences of wrongful property seizures, such as confiscations, forced sales and sales 
under duress of property, which were part of the persecution of these innocent people and 
groups, the vast majority of whom died heirless.” Eren Waitzman, Terezin Declaration:  The 
Restitution of Property, U.K. PARLIAMENT:  HOUSE OF LORDS LIBRARY (July 20, 2020), 
https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/terezin-declaration-the-restitution-of-property 
[https://perma.cc/HRE3-G5AL]. 
 30. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(6) (“In some cases, this means 
that the claims expired before World War II even ended.”). 
 31. 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 32. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(7).  But see infra Part II.C. 
 33. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(7). 
 34. See Chattel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “chattel” as 
“[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property; esp., a physical object capable of 
manual delivery and not the subject matter of real property”). 
 35. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991). 
 36. Replevin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 37. See Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
“statute of limitations” as “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute 
establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued”). 
 38. See Replevin, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu 
/wex/replevin [https://perma.cc/GP52-27VA] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021) (“Rules on replevin 
actions vary by jurisdiction.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 64)). 
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on reliable evidence.39  While in the case of stolen valuable artwork it may 
seem unfair to statutorily bar an original owner from making a claim for 
return of an item, statutes of limitations also serve to discourage negligent, 
and even calculated, delay by plaintiffs bringing causes of action.40  
Although some meritorious claims will inevitably be time-barred, states 
impose these procedural bars on recovery out of fairness to defendants and 
on the assumption that claimants with meritorious claims “will not delay in 
asserting them.”41 
One difficulty in applying statutes of limitations is determining at what 
point a cause of action “accrues,” or the statute begins to run.42  The accrual 
rules applied by states are not uniform, and they are often left to courts to 
establish because they are not addressed in state statutes; even when they are 
addressed by statute, they are often left vague.43  While a cause of action for 
replevin of stolen art originally accrued “at the time of the wrongful 
taking,”44 courts relied on equitable doctrines to alter the time of accrual in 
cases of stolen art.45  These equitable considerations led to the discovery 
rule46 and the demand and refusal rule.47 
C.  The Original Rule:  Accrual from the Time of Theft 
The original rule for the accrual of a cause of action for replevin provided 
that “the cause of action for the recovery of stolen art [or any other chattel] 
traditionally accrued at the time of the wrongful taking.”48  This original rule 
was a direct result of the vagueness with which state legislatures described 
“accrual” in their statutes of limitations.49  Most state legislatures only 
 
 39. See Statute of Limitations, supra note 37 (“Statutes of limitations, like the equitable 
doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing 
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has 
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” (quoting Ord. of R.R. Tels. 
v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944))). 
 40. See Leah E. Eisen, Commentary, The Missing Piece:  A Discussion of Theft, Statutes 
of Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art World, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1072 
(1991). 
 41. See id. at 1072–73. 
 42. See id. at 1073. 
 43. See id. at 1073–75. 
 44. Id. at 1074. 
 45. Id. at 1074–75.  “[D]ue to the growing recognition of the difficulty of discovering who 
possesses stolen property and the ease with which individuals can hide property,” these other 
doctrines emerged. Id.  For a discussion of why the doctrine of adverse possession is 
inconducive to cases of stolen art, see id. at 1075–78 (citing O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 
862 (N.J. 1980)). 
 46. See infra Part I.D. 
 47. See infra Part I.E. 
 48. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1074; see also Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-1033, 
2007 WL 1016996, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007) (holding that a woman’s claim for a van 
Gogh painting, sold under Nazi persecution, accrued in 1938 when the painting was sold and 
thus the statute ran while World War II was still going on). 
 49. See Eisen, supra note 40, at 1073 (“While state legislatures typically designate the 
length of a limitations period, they tend to leave the responsibility for determining when the 
accrual period begins to the courts.”). 
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provide that the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action 
accrues but do not define accrual.50  Courts thus originally premised accrual 
on the idea that “the cause of action accrues upon the commission of the 
tortious act”—which, for a cause of action for replevin, would be the time of 
the theft.51  From there, the thief would be said to be in “adverse possession” 
of the chattel—such that upon the running of the statute, the thief would 
acquire good title.52 
This original accrual rule gradually changed as courts began to recognize 
the difficulty of identifying the possessor of a stolen chattel and the “ease 
with which” movable chattels can be hidden.53  Thus, courts developed 
judicial doctrines to defer the accrual of a cause of action for replevin of a 
stolen chattel past the date of the theft and to some other date in the future.54  
The two modern accrual rules relevant to this Note are the discovery rule55 
and the demand and refusal rule.56 
D.  Modern Adaptations:  The Discovery Rule 
The discovery rule provides that “in an appropriate case, a cause of action 
[for replevin] will not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by exercise 
of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts which 
form the basis of a cause of action.”57  Courts have adopted the discovery 
rule “[t]o avoid harsh results from the mechanical application of the 
statute.”58  In applying the discovery rule to a cause of action for replevin of 
artwork, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that renowned artist Georgia 
O’Keeffe’s statute of limitations for replevin of allegedly stolen paintings 
began to run only when she knew or should have known “of the cause of 
 
 50. See id. at 1073 n.32. 
 51. Id. at 1074. 
 52. See Adverse Possession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The doctrine 
by which title to real property is acquired as a result of such use or enjoyment over a specified 
period of time.”); see also O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980) (“The 
acquisition of title to real and personal property by adverse possession is based on the 
expiration of a statute of limitations. . . .  To establish title by adverse possession to chattels, 
the rule of law has been that the possession must be hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and 
continuous.” (citations omitted)).  For a more thorough discussion of adverse possession, see 
Henson, supra note 26, at 1136–37. 
 53. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1074–78 (describing that the moveable nature of chattels 
supports a change in the accrual rules for stolen chattels, stating:  “one can readily move and 
easily conceal art objects”).  Compare, for example, a cause of action for the eviction of an 
adverse possessor of real property, which is not moveable:  “The considerations are different 
with real estate . . . .  Real estate is fixed and cannot be moved or concealed.  The owner of 
real property knows or should know where his property is located and reasonably can be 
expected to be aware of . . . [adverse] possession on it.” O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873.  For a 
further discussion of the mobility of artwork, see Henson, supra note 26, at 1148. 
 54. See Eisen, supra note 40, at 1075. 
 55. See infra Part I.D. 
 56. See infra Part I.E. 
 57. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 869 (citing Burd v. N.J. Tel. Co., 386 A.2d 1310, 1311 (N.J. 
1978)). 
 58. Id. 
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action, including the identity of the possessor of the paintings.”59  The 
discovery rule, in calling for the accrual of an action for replevin upon actual 
or constructive discovery, emphasizes due diligence.60 
In O’Keeffe v. Snyder,61 the Supreme Court of New Jersey employed the 
discovery rule.  O’Keeffe sought to replevy three of her paintings that turned 
up in Barry Snyder’s possession, who at the time was doing business as the 
Princeton Gallery of Fine Art.62  O’Keeffe filed her complaint in 1976 and 
alleged that the paintings had gone missing from An American Place Art 
Gallery in 1946.63  Factually significant to the court’s use of the discovery 
rule was that O’Keeffe, upon noticing her paintings were missing from the 
gallery, told no one and did not report the missing paintings to the proper 
authorities.64  Furthermore, the paintings were uninsured; O’Keeffe sought 
no reimbursement for the paintings; O’Keeffe did not publish the missing 
paintings; and in mentioning the missing paintings to the director of The Art 
Institute of Chicago, she took no measures to ask him to help locate the 
paintings.65 
It was not until 1972, about twenty-six years after the paintings went 
missing, that O’Keeffe allowed the paintings’ loss to be reported to the Art 
Dealers Association of America.66  In 1975, O’Keeffe discovered the 
paintings were in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York, and in 1976, she 
discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had sold the paintings to Snyder.67  Frank 
claimed that his father was in possession of the paintings prior to their alleged 
disappearance.68  Frank therefore claimed good title by adverse possession, 
even if the paintings had been stolen.69 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey began its discussion of the discovery 
rule by citing its use in determining accrual for medical malpractice actions.70  
From there, the court noted the proliferating use of the discovery rule in other 
areas of the law, before concluding that “the discovery rule applies to an 
action for replevin of a painting under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.”71  The court 
remanded to the trial court to determine if O’Keeffe was “entitled to the 
 
 59. Id. at 870. 
 60. See Jason Barnes, Note, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016:  
A Federal Reform to State Statutes of Limitations for Art Restitution Claims, 56 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 593, 607 (2018). 
 61. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980). 
 62. Id. at 864. 
 63. Id. at 864–65. 
 64. See id. at 865–66. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 866. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  There was a factual dispute between the parties regarding Frank’s father’s 
acquisition of the paintings. Id.  O’Keeffe claimed the paintings were stolen, while Frank 
claimed that he saw the paintings in his father’s apartment years before O’Keeffe claims the 
theft occurred. Id.  Nonetheless, “[f]or the purposes of this motion, Snyder conceded that the 
paintings had been stolen.” Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 869. 
 71. Id. at 869–70. 
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benefit of the discovery rule.”72  In so holding, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey directed the trial court to consider a number of factors, including: 
(1) whether O’Keeffe used due diligence to recover the paintings at the time 
of the alleged theft and thereafter; (2) whether at the time of the alleged 
theft there was an effective method, other than talking to her colleagues, 
for O’Keeffe to alert the art world; and (3) whether registering paintings 
with the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. or any other organization 
would put a reasonably prudent purchaser of art on constructive notice that 
someone other than the possessor was the true owner.73 
The trial court did not have the opportunity to apply the discovery rule in the 
case because the parties settled prior to retrial.74  Of the three paintings at 
issue, O’Keeffe took one, Snyder took one, and the third was sold at a 
Sotheby’s auction, with the proceeds used to pay their lawyers.75 
E.  Modern Adaptations:  The Demand and Refusal Rule and the Laches 
Defense 
The demand and refusal rule, used in New York, states that “a cause of 
action for replevin against the good-faith purchaser of a stolen chattel accrues 
when the true owner makes demand for return of the chattel and the person 
in possession of the chattel refuses to return it.”76  The rule is premised on 
the idea that “[u]ntil the original owner demands the return of her property, 
one cannot consider the innocent purchaser’s possession wrongful or 
unlawful.”77 
In Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell,78 the Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Foundation, on behalf of the Guggenheim Museum, sought the 
return of a $200,000 gouache by Marc Chagall.79  Through the use of 
accession cards, the Guggenheim alleged that it discovered the gouache was 
missing “sometime in the late 1960s, but [the Guggenheim] claims it did not 
know that the painting had in fact been stolen until it undertook a complete 
inventory of the museum collection beginning in 1969 and ending in 1970.”80 
 
 72. Id. at 870. 
 73. Id. 
 74. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY:  CONCISE EDITION 159 (2d ed. 2017).  While 
often employed in cases of artwork recovery, the topic of settlement is outside the scope of 
this Note. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991).  For a 
discussion of one of the first uses of the demand and refusal rule, see Henson, supra note 26, 
at 1110–12 (citing Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1964)). 
 77. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1079; see also Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 429 (“Until demand is 
made and refused, possession of the stolen property by the good-faith purchaser for value is 
not considered wrongful.”). 
 78. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991). 
 79. Id. at 427.  Chagall painted the gouache entitled Menageries, or alternatively Le 
Marchand de Bestiaux, in 1912. Id. at 428. 
 80. Id.  These facts were disputed by the defendant. Id. 
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Upon learning of the theft, the Guggenheim took no steps to publicize the 
missing painting.81  The Guggenheim did not notify any art organization nor 
did it notify the proper authorities about the theft.82  The Guggenheim 
claimed that its decision not to publicize the theft was “tactical.”83  It feared 
that such a publicization would force the gouache further into the black 
market, making it all the more difficult to locate the painting and effectuate 
its return.84 
The New York Court of Appeals stated that New York had explicitly 
rejected the discovery rule and instead had chosen to continue use of the 
demand and refusal rule.85  Notably, the court pointed to Governor Mario 
Cuomo’s veto of a New York State Senate bill that would cause the statute 
of limitations to run once a museum, in possession of an artwork, had given 
notice of its possession.86  In applying the demand and refusal rule, the New 
York Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s suggestion that the 
Guggenheim’s failure to search with due diligence barred recovery under the 
statute of limitations.87  However, the court emphasized that its rejection of 
the discovery rule was not intended to “sanction[] the museum’s conduct or 
suggest[] that the museum’s conduct [was] no longer an issue in this case.”88  
Upon an additional showing of actual prejudice, which is not required to 
invoke the statute of limitations, the court noted that the defendant would be 
able to assert lack of due diligence as part of a laches defense.89 
Thus, unlike the discovery rule, the demand and refusal rule places no 
importance on diligent search for a stolen chattel.90  However, diligent search 
still factors into an action for replevin in New York through the doctrine of 
laches; even under New York’s demand and refusal rule, “a defendant may 
still assert a laches defense.”91 
Where a defendant asserts a laches defense, the defendant “must show that 
the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on its rights so as to make a decree against 
the defendant unfair.  Laches . . . requires a showing by the defendant that it 
has been prejudiced by the plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in bringing the 
 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 430. 
 86. See id.  Governor Cuomo’s veto message stated that the implementation of such a rule 
“would have caused New York to become ‘a haven for cultural property stolen abroad since 
such objects [would] be immune from recovery under the limited time periods established by 
the bill.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum #22 Filed with Assembly Bill 
Number 11,462-A, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR MARIO M. CUOMO 1986, at 355, 356 
(1990)).  For discussion of New York’s rejection of a due diligence requirement as part of 
demand and refusal, see Henson, supra note 26, at 1125 n.200. 
 87. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. at 430 (“[T]here is no reason to obscure [the rule’s] straightforward protection 
of true owners by creating a duty of reasonable diligence.”). 
 91. Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 196 n.12 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing 
Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 426). 
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action.”92  The two elements of a laches defense—unreasonable delay by the 
plaintiff and prejudice to the defendant—prevent claimants from “delay[ing] 
bringing their claims indefinitely without consequence.”93  Both demand and 
refusal plus laches and the discovery rule are accrual rules worth examining 
through the lens of the HEAR Act. 
F.  The HEAR Act 
In 2016, Congress enacted the HEAR Act94 “[t]o provide the victims of 
Holocaust-era persecution and their heirs a fair opportunity to recover works 
of art confiscated or misappropriated by the Nazis.”95  The HEAR Act 
supplants state statutes of limitations for “artwork or other property that was 
lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution.”96  Actions that 
fall within these parameters “may be commenced not later than 6 years after 
the actual discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant of—(1) the 
identity and location of the artwork or other property; and (2) a possessory 
interest of the claimant in the artwork or other property.”97  The HEAR Act 
does not “create a civil claim or cause of action under Federal or State law.”98 
The accrual of a cause of action under the HEAR Act is based on “actual 
discovery,” which the HEAR Act defines as “knowledge” or “having actual 
 
 92. Id. at 193 (citing Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. Optibase Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 132 
(2d Cir. 2003)). 
 93. Id. at 197 n.12. 
 94. Since its enactment in 2016, the HEAR Act has been cited fairly limitedly in case law. 
See generally Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 186 (discussing a request for return of Pablo Picasso’s 
The Actor); Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 894 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018), vacated 
141 S. Ct. 703 (2021) (discussing request for recovery of Welfenschatz, a medieval relics 
collection); Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(discussing the forced sale of a Camille Pissarro impressionist painting); De Csepel v. 
Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (discussing request for recovery of a 
Nazi-confiscated art collection); Reif v. Nagy, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5 (App. Div. 2019) (discussing 
request for return of two works by Egon Schiele); Est. of Kainer v. UBS AG, 34 N.Y.S.3d 58 
(App. Div. 2016) (discussing request for return of a Degas painting looted by Nazis from an 
art collection); Gowen v. Helly Nahmad Gallery, Inc., 77 N.Y.S.3d 605 (Sup. Ct. 2018) 
(discussing request for return of Amedeo Modigliani’s Seated Man with a Cane).  For a 
discussion of the jurisdictional issues involving the HEAR Act recently before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, see Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Jewish Property in Nazi 
Germany and Hungary, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-
court-hears-arguments-on-jewish-property-in-nazi-germany-and-hungary-11607386812 
[https://perma.cc/XDC4-TAFH]. 
 95. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong. (as reported 
by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29, 2016); see Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act 
of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note.  The HEAR Act was a triumphant piece of bipartisan 
legislation, introduced by Senators John Cornyn (R-TX), Ted Cruz (R-TX), and Chuck 
Schumer (D-NY). See Max Kutner, Obama Signs New Law to Help Recover Nazi-Looted Art, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/obama-hear-act-law-holocaust-
534793 [https://perma.cc/276C-FEE5].  The HEAR Act was ultimately passed unanimously. 
Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the Ambiguities and Uncertainties of the 
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 158 (2019). 
 96. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(a). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 5(f). For a discussion of whether the failure to establish a federal cause of action 
renders the HEAR Act unconstitutional, see infra Part II.C. 
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knowledge of a fact or circumstance or sufficient information with regard to 
a relevant fact or circumstance to amount to actual knowledge thereof.”99 
In Zuckerman v. Metropolitan Museum of Art,100 the Second Circuit held 
that the doctrine of laches is an applicable defense to a claim under the HEAR 
Act.  In 1912, Paul Friedrich Leffman purchased Pablo Picasso’s The 
Actor.101  In an effort to flee Nazi Germany, Leffman sold the painting to 
what was called an “‘Aryan’ corporation[], receiving ‘nominal 
compensation.’”102  Käte Perls, on behalf of two others, acquired the painting 
from Leffman for just $12,000 in 1938.103  The Leffmanns went to 
Switzerland in 1938 and eventually to Brazil in 1941.104  In 1947, the 
Leffmanns returned to Switzerland, where they remained until their 
deaths.105 
Laurel Zuckerman, the ancillary administrator of the estate of Leffmann’s 
great-grandniece, later filed suit against the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
(“the Met”) for the return of the Picasso painting on September 30, 2016, in 
the Southern District of New York.106  In response, the Met asserted that 
Zuckerman’s claims were barred by the doctrine of laches.107  Zuckerman 
contended that the claim was not time-barred under the HEAR Act’s statute 
of limitations and that laches is unavailable as a defense in a case under the 
HEAR Act.108 
The Second Circuit noted the general rule that “in [the] face of a statute of 
limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal 
relief.”109  Nonetheless, the court held that laches, a traditionally equitable 
defense, is applicable to the HEAR Act because the HEAR Act only 
explicitly precludes the use of “defense[s] at law relating to the passage of 
time.”110  The court further cited a Senate committee report indicating 
Congress’s intent to allow laches defenses in cases under the HEAR Act.111  
While a prior iteration of the bill precluded the use of “any . . . defense at law 
 
 99. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 4. 
 100. 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 101. Id. at 190. 
 102. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix Volume 1 of 2 (Pages A-1 to A-293) at A-34, Zuckerman, 
928 F.3d (No. 18-0634-CV), ECF no. 49-1. 
 103. Id. at 191.  In 2010—just before a woman tripped in the museum and caused a six-
inch tear in the painting, depreciating its value—The Actor was valued at $130 million. 
Maureen O’Connor, The Price of Falling into a Picasso:  $65 Million, GAWKER (Jan. 26, 
2010, 4:42 AM), https://gawker.com/5457026/the-price-of-falling-into-a-picasso-65-million 
[https://perma.cc/FE2Q-ZWPL]. 
 104. Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 191. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 192. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 195. 
 109. Id. at 195–96 (alteration in original) (quoting Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 
572 U.S. 663, 679 (2014)). 
 110. Id. at 196 (alteration in original) (quoting Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act 
of 2016 § 5(a), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note). 
 111. See id. at 196–97. 
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or equity relating to the passage of time (including the doctrine of laches),”112 
the HEAR Act as enacted did not include this language in its text.113  The 
Senate report discussed by the court stated that the enacted HEAR Act 
intentionally “remove[d] the reference precluding the availability of 
equitable defenses and the doctrine of laches.”114 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit found the Met’s laches defense successful 
and barred Zuckerman’s claim under the HEAR Act.115  In addressing each 
of the elements of laches, the court found:  (1) the Leffmann’s failure to look 
for the painting or bring a claim for over seventy years constituted 
“unreasonable delay”116 and (2) the extensive time that passed resulted in 
“‘deceased witness[es], faded memories, . . . and hearsay testimony of 
questionable value,’ as well as the likely disappearance of documentary 
evidence.”117  Thus, the Met was prejudiced by Zuckerman’s delay.118 
Additionally, the HEAR Act has a retroactivity scheme in place.119  Under 
section 5(c), the statute of limitations begins to run as of the date of the HEAR 
Act’s enactment where:  (1) the claimant already had knowledge before 
enactment of the HEAR Act120 but was already barred from asserting a claim 
under a preexisting statute of limitations121 or (2) the claimant already had 
knowledge before the enactment of the HEAR Act122 and was not already 
barred under a preexisting statute of limitations.123  Under section 5(d), the 
HEAR Act applies to cases pending in court as of the date of enactment.124  
Under section 5(e), the HEAR Act does not apply to cases barred on a date 
before enactment if:  (1) the claimant had knowledge on or after January 1, 
 
 112. Id. at 197 (alteration in original) (quoting Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, 
S. 2763, 114th Cong. § 5(c)(2)(A) (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 7, 2016)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 7 (2016)).  “Where 
Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to 
enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.” Id. (quoting Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 193. 
 117. Id. at 194 (alteration in original) (quoting Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 
550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (App. Div. 1990)). 
 118. Id.  Zuckerman’s appeal to the Supreme Court was denied—a decision critics say 
“signal[s] to Holocaust victims and their families that pursuing their property is a fruitless 
endeavor.” Sam. P. Israel, The US Supreme Court’s Silence on Nazi Art Theft Fails Holocaust 
Survivors, ART NEWSPAPER (Mar. 11, 2020), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/comment/the-
us-supreme-court-s-silence-on-nazi-art-theft-fails-holocaust-survivors 
[https://perma.cc/4CHV-ZPDA]. 
 119. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(c)–(e), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 
note.  For a discussion of the HEAR Act’s applicability to preexisting claims, see Frankel & 
Sharoni, supra note 95, at 169–72. 
 120. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(c)(1)(A). 
 121. Id. § 5(c)(1)(B). 
 122. Id. § 5(c)(2)(A). 
 123. Id. § 5(c)(2)(B). 
 124. Id. § 5(d). 
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1999125 and (2) six or more years have passed since the claimant acquired 
knowledge.126 
Finally, the HEAR Act contains a sunset provision, such that the Act 
expires on January 1, 2027.127  The expiration of the HEAR Act and its future 
implications are the subject of this Note. 
II.  WHEN SHOULD THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUE?:  DISCOVERY VERSUS 
DEMAND AND REFUSAL 
Upon expiration of the HEAR Act, the accrual of a cause of action for 
recovery of Nazi-confiscated art will revert back to the respective state’s 
rule—that is, the discovery rule in the majority of states and the demand and 
refusal rule in New York.128  Parts II.A and II.B analyze the pros and cons of 
both the discovery rule and the demand and refusal rule to shed light on the 
likely choices immediately available to states upon the HEAR Act’s 
expiration.  Part II.C addresses the constitutionality concerns surrounding the 
HEAR Act. 
A.  Should Discovery Be the Rule? 
The discovery rule, in predicating the accrual of the cause of action on 
actual or constructive discovery, does well to ensure that original owners, or 
their heirs, diligently search for their items.129  Furthermore, the discovery 
rule is unlike “[e]arly doctrines,” such as the “adverse possession doctrine” 
and “demand and refusal,” which “focused on the actions of subsequent 
purchasers or arbitrary events.”130  In that respect, the discovery rule is 
logical in that it holds the running of the statute accountable to the actions of 
the party bringing the claim for the item’s return.131 
Nonetheless, the discovery rule faces criticism.  For example, since the 
provenances of Nazi-confiscated art are not easily acquired, a rule that is 
premised on diligent search is inconducive in cases of Nazi-confiscated 
artwork restitution.132  Additionally, under the discovery rule, “the burden 
rests with the claimant to demonstrate why the limitation period should be 
extended.”133  Thus, where the ultimate goal is returning art to its original 
owner, the discovery rule puts an unnecessary (and even impracticable, in the 
context of Nazi-confiscated art) onus on the original owner to prove diligent 
 
 125. Id. § 5(e)(1). 
 126. Id. § 5(e)(2). 
 127. Id. § 5(g). 
 128. Id.; see supra Parts I.D–E. 
 129. See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980) (citing Burd v. N.J. Tel. Co., 
386 A.2d 1310, 1311 (N.J. 1978)). 
 130. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1070. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See Barnes, supra note 60, at 596. 
 133. Id. at 608. 
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search.134  In other words, the restoration goal of the discovery rule is at odds 
with its due diligence requirement.135 
Leah Eisen points to a number of other issues raised by the discovery 
rule.136  Eisen argues that the inconsistent application by courts of the 
discovery rule is detrimental to both the claimant and the current possessor—
presumably for its lack of uniformity, consistency, and predictability.137  
According to Eisen, “[t]his lack of clarity and consistency among the various 
jurisdictions places owners and possessors of stolen art in precarious 
positions.”138  Owners may undertake unnecessary investigation for fear of 
being barred if they do not, and possessors who face diligently searching 
owners will receive no repose so long as the owner continues searching.139  
For Eisen, it is unfair to subject good-faith purchasers to lawsuits where the 
good-faith purchaser has been in possession for “ten, twenty, or even one 
hundred years” merely because the original owner has continued to diligently 
search for the item.140  Moreover, where a purchaser fears a retribution claim 
from a diligently searching owner in a discovery jurisdiction, the purchaser 
is incentivized to hide the object from the public.141 
Eisen also faults the discovery rule for its one-sidedness; since the rule 
fails to place a “duty of diligence” on the possessor in the same way it does 
the original owner, the discovery rule misses an opportunity to effectuate 
retribution from both sides.142  Under Eisen’s proposed reciprocal rule, the 
incentive for thieves to engage in the stolen art market would decrease 
because both the original owner and the purchaser would be tasked with due 
diligence.143 
Finally, Eisen “argues that the implementation of the discovery rule creates 
an irreconcilable conflict with the previously-established legal notion that a 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See generally Eisen, supra note 40. 
 137. See id. at 1071 (“[T]he courts have not established objective standards of conduct for 
possessors and owners to follow.”). 
 138. Id. at 1091. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. at 1089–90. 
 141. Id. at 1091. 
 142. Id. at 1094–95.  Eisen suggests that “a more efficient method of determining whether 
an owner has the right to sue a subsequent purchaser would be to retain the discovery rule’s 
investigatory duty on the owner and add a reciprocal investigatory duty on the purchaser.” Id. 
at 1096.  Now Judge Steven A. Bibas, in his Yale Law Journal student note, furthers this 
argument for placing an onus on the purchaser. See generally Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case 
Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2463 (1994).  Uniform 
Commercial Code section 2-312(1)(a) provides for a warranty of good title. U.C.C. § 2-
312(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2012).  Under this section, if an original owner is 
able to recover his stolen art from a purchaser, the purchaser is then able to recover his loss 
from the merchant that he purchased from by using the warranty of good title. Bibas, supra, 
at 2463.  By placing the cost on the purchaser, who can ultimately shift that cost to the 
merchant, purchasers will be incentivized “to buy from reputable, solvent merchants who 
investigate.” Id.  For another argument for placing a burden of diligence on the purchaser, see 
Henson, supra note 26, at 1150–52. 
 143. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1097. 
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thief does not obtain good title to stolen property.”144  Eisen illustrates that 
if a thief can never acquire good title, then a subsequent good-faith purchaser 
can never acquire good title because the thief cannot transfer title that he does 
not have.145  Thus, “[s]ince a subsequent possessor does not have title to the 
stolen art object, an owner automatically has the right to bring an action for 
its recovery.”146  Yet, the discovery rule’s bar on a claim where the owner 
does not diligently search for the item strips the owner of his right to bring a 
claim of superior title that he has, at least under this long-held doctrine, 
always had.147  The two options that then stand before courts are to “punish 
good faith purchasers for accidentally buying stolen art” or to grant good title 
to thieves—neither of which is a particularly desirable choice.148 
B.  New York’s Push for Demand and Refusal 
Proponents of New York’s idiosyncratic demand and refusal rule argue 
that the rule “affords the most protection to the true owners of stolen 
property.”149  In so arguing, proponents of the rule laude its 
“straightforwardness” and ability to “eliminate some judicial discretion.”150 
The bright-line aspect of the demand and refusal rule thus results in more 
consistent and predictable court decisions.151  This consistency and 
predictability is arguably more efficient and less costly for claimants.152  The 
demand and refusal rule also deserves consideration simply because it is the 
preferred accrual rule of New York—the “mecca of the art world.”153 
The demand and refusal rule further prevents the judicial hindsight bias 
that impedes fair application of the discovery rule.154  There is concern that 
the discovery rule’s “reasonableness standard” can result in judicial 
 
 144. Id. at 1071. 
 145. Id. at 1099. 
 146. Id. at 1100. 
 147. Id. at 1099–100.  Note, however, that allowing a thief to obtain good title is precisely 
what a statute of limitations does in the first place. 
 148. Id. at 1100. 
 149. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991); see 
also Henson, supra note 26, at 1145 (arguing not for a demand and refusal rule but for a rule 
that at least better protects original owners). 
 150. Barnes, supra note 60, at 609.  Raymond Dowd suggests that constructive knowledge 
under the discovery rule was a legal fiction created by judges that stripped claimants of their 
“traditional common law rights”—ultimately allowing judges, rather than juries, to decide 
cases. See Email from Raymond J. Dowd, Partner, Dunnington Bartholow & Miller, LLP, to 
author (Oct. 6, 2020, 09:42 EST) [hereinafter Dowd Email] (on file with author); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law.”). 
 151. Barnes, supra note 60, at 609. 
 152. See id.  Uncertainty is especially costly where the steps necessary to satisfy “due 
diligence” may counterintuitively drive the stolen work further underground. See Lubell, 569 
N.E.2d at 428. 
 153. Barnes, supra note 60, at 609. 
 154. See id. 
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determinations of lack of due diligence simply because judges have the 
benefit of time and information that was not available to original owners.155 
Proponents also argue that the demand and refusal rule’s use of a laches 
defense is a better way to incorporate a due diligence requirement than 
requiring due diligence to rebut a statute of limitations defense; under 
demand and refusal, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove lack of 
diligence.156  This ultimately allows a claimant to at least have a day in court 
without having to carry the initial burden of meeting an uncertain due 
diligence standard. 
The demand and refusal rule nonetheless faces criticism.  The primary 
concern with the demand and refusal rule is it is supplemented by laches, 
which, it is argued, “adds uncertainty to the bright-line demand and refusal 
rule, especially since the level of diligence required ‘depends on the 
circumstances of the case.’”157  Further, the burden-shifting framework for 
diligence under laches can be viewed as too claimant friendly.158  Successful 
laches defenses are infrequent, exacerbating the claimant bias of the rule.159 
Raymond Dowd argues that laches (in addition to statutes of limitations 
generally) “ought not be available in cases of stolen artworks of European 
provenance that entered the United States after 1932 and that were created 
prior to 1946.”160  Dowd argues against defenses such as laches, specifically 
in cases of Nazi-confiscated art, for two primary reasons:  the stolen artwork 
should be considered contraband and thus violative of criminal law161 and 
Holocaust victims should not be punished for having “been frozen out of 
records that might help them track assets for decades.”162 
 
 155. See id. 
 156. Cf. id. 
 157. Id. at 610 (first quoting DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1987); and 
then citing Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 429–30). 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id.; see also Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents:  Creating an 
Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of 
Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 52 (1995) (calling laches a “fact intensive inquiry [that] 
can rarely be resolved without protracted litigation”).  But see Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum 
of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019); Raymond J. Dowd, Finding Hope for Restitution of Nazi-
Looted Art?:  The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, in BUILDING BRIDGES 
AMONG ABRAHAM’S CHILDREN:  A CELEBRATION OF MICHAEL BERENBAUM (Ed Gaffney ed., 
forthcoming 2021). 
 160. Raymond J. Dowd, Nazi Looted Art and Cocaine:  When Museum Directors Take It, 
Call the Cops, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 529, 529 (2013). 
 161. Id. at 529–30 (“If a museum director asserted statutes of limitations or laches when 
caught with a kilo of cocaine, such defenses would not pass the laugh test.”). 
 162. Id. at 530; see also Herbert I. Lazerow, Holocaust Art Disputes:  The Holocaust 
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 51 INT’L LAW. no. 2, 2018, at 195, 258 (“HEAR is 
also likely to make litigation more expensive by shifting from the simple question of whether 
the statute of limitations has expired to the question of whether the claimant is barred by the 
doctrine of laches, with its requirement of discovery and a separate trial on that issue.”); 
Rachel Sklar, Holocaust-Era Restitution Claims:  Is the HEAR Act a Game Changer?, 12 
REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 159, 194 (2017) (proposing the HEAR Act be amended to 
preclude laches defenses). 
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An oft-overlooked issue with the demand and refusal rule is its treatment 
of thieves.163  The demand and refusal rule applies only to good-faith 
purchasers164 and “is premised on the theory that the defendant’s possession 
is not wrongful until he or she refuses to return the property to the 
claimant.”165  As Eisen states:  “if the possessor is a wrongful taker or a 
purchaser with knowledge, courts should not require a demand, because the 
possessor already has notice of his wrongful retention of the original owner’s 
property.”166  It is further suggested by Judith Wallace that the rule does not 
apply to thieves because “demand would be futile . . . if the possessor is a 
thief who would know his possession is wrongful,” he would “presumably 
refuse any demand.”167  This wrinkle leads to the result that a thief or bad-
faith purchaser may be advantaged over a good-faith purchaser.168 
A hypothetical can illustrate this result.  If a thief (T) steals a work of art 
from an owner (O) in a demand and refusal jurisdiction with a three-year 
statute of limitations, the statute begins to run when the theft occurs because 
the demand and refusal rule applies only to good-faith purchasers, not 
thieves.  Thus, if T holds on to the art for the requisite three-year period, or 
sells it to a bad-faith purchaser who is aware that the art has been stolen, and 
holds on to the art for three years, T or the bad-faith purchaser will acquire 
title upon the running of the statute.  However, if T sells the art to a good-
faith purchaser who is unaware that the art had been stolen, O’s cause of 
action against the good-faith purchaser would not begin to run until there was 
a demand by O and a refusal by the good-faith purchaser.  Thus, T or the bad-
faith purchaser could acquire title within three years of the theft, while the 
good-faith purchaser could not acquire title until three years after a demand 
and refusal.  Note, however, that once O has made a demand, the good-faith 
purchaser will either acquiesce and return the art or refuse its return, and O 
will immediately file suit.  Thus, there is no practical situation where the 
statute can run and transfer title to the good-faith purchaser.  Therefore, T 
and the bad-faith purchaser will be treated better than a good-faith purchaser. 
 
 163. See generally Eisen, supra note 40, at 1080–81. 
 164. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991). 
 165. Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 95, at 172; see also Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 429 (“Until 
demand is made and refused, possession of the stolen property by the good-faith purchaser for 
value is not considered wrongful.”); Eisen, supra note 40, at 1079. 
 166. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1080.  Contra infra Part III.C. 
 167. Judith Wallace, New York’s Distinctive Rule Regarding Recovery of Misappropriated 
Art After the Court of Appeals’ Decision in Mirvish v. Mott, SPENCER’S ART L.J. (June 2012), 
http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/spencer/spencers-art-law-journal-7-18-12.asp 
[https://perma.cc/38XQ-QEXN]. 
 168. See Eisen, supra note 40, at 1080–81.  For a discussion of thieves being treated better 
than good-faith purchasers, see Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 429 (“In DeWeerth v. Baldinger, which 
the trial court in this case relied upon in granting Mrs. Lubell’s summary judgment motion, 
the Second Circuit took note of the fact that New York case law treats thieves and good-faith 
purchasers differently and looked to that difference as a basis for imposing a reasonable 
diligence requirement on the owners of stolen art.” (citing DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 
103 (2d Cir. 1987))).  Note, however, that the New York Court of Appeals rejected the Second 
Circuit’s imposition of a due diligence requirement. Id. at 430. 
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C.  Is the HEAR Act Even Constitutional? 
William L. Charron has suggested that the HEAR Act may be 
unconstitutional.169  Charron argues that the HEAR Act, by supplanting 
states’ statutes of limitations without creating a federal cause of action or 
rooting itself in any provision of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, 
should be seen as an exclusively procedural statute.170  According to 
Charron, the HEAR Act’s failure to create a federal cause of action is 
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment’s principles of federalism, and 
“procedural rules governing state law claims should be deemed reserved to 
the states under the Tenth Amendment.”171 
Charron’s unconstitutionality argument results in a difficult tension 
between state and federal powers with respect to statutes of limitations for 
Nazi-confiscated art.  Recall that the court in Von Saher I held that the state 
of California was unable to carve out an exception from its statute of 
limitations specifically for Nazi-confiscated art.172  In response to this 
decision, Congress passed legislation to protect Nazi-confiscated art in a way 
that states, under Von Saher I, could not.173  While the HEAR Act attempts 
to root its validity in Von Saher I and Congress’s foreign affairs power,174 
Charron notes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Von Saher v. Norton Simon 
Museum175 (Von Saher II):  “the court in Von Saher II held that a claim for 
restitution asserted against a private party (not against a foreign government), 
under ‘a state statute of general applicability’ (such as for replevin) rather 
than under ‘Holocaust-specific legislation,’ raises no foreign policy conflicts 
sufficient to trigger foreign affairs preemption.”176  Thus, Charron’s 
argument raises an interesting issue:  who, Congress or the states, is able to 
address Nazi-confiscated art in this way?177 
Emily J. Cunningham raises another constitutionality argument against the 
HEAR Act by asserting that the HEAR Act’s retroactivity may render the 
Act unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.178  Cunningham cites 
 
 169. See generally William L. Charron, The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption 
Presented by the Federal HEAR Act, 2018 PEPP. L. REV. 19. 
 170. Id. at 61. 
 171. Id. at 60–61; see U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”).  But see Jennifer A. Kreder & Virginia L. Schell, The 
Constitutionality of the HEAR Act:  Empowering American Courts to Return Holocaust-Era 
Artwork and Honor History, 30 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 68 (2020) (“The 
HEAR Act is constitutional and does not violate the principles of federalism.”). 
 172. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Charron, supra note 169, at 36; see also Dowd Email, supra note 150.  For a 
discussion of how Congress may have the power to regulate the art market through the 
Commerce Clause, see Henson, supra note 26, at 1154. 
 175. 754 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 176. Charron, supra note 169, at 36 n.83 (quoting Von Saher II, 754 F.3d at 719, 723). 
 177. Part III assumes the validity of Charron’s argument and the validity of Von Saher I.  
See infra Part III.A.5. 
 178. See Emily J. Cunningham, Note, Justice on the Merits:  An Analysis of the Holocaust 
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 69 CASE. W. RSRV. L. REV. 427, 452 (2018); see also 
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Campbell v. Holt179 as evidence of her proposition.  In Campbell, the Court 
indicated, albeit in dicta, that in a case of recovery of personal property, “[i]t 
may . . . very well be held that . . . where the question is as to the removal of 
the bar of the statute of limitations by a legislative act passed after the bar 
has become perfect, such act deprives the party of his property without due 
process of law.”180  Cunningham then rebuts her own claim by stating that 
since the HEAR Act provides for subsequent trial or arbitration, such taking 
of property would not violate procedural due process rights because cases 
would be heard before a court or tribunal before any property was taken.181  
Nonetheless, Cunningham raises interesting questions of the constitutionality 
of retroactivity under the Fifth Amendment, and Part III addresses these 
concerns.182 
III.  THE HEAR ACT PROMOTES DEMAND AND REFUSAL AND HOW STATES 
SHOULD IMPLEMENT IT 
Upon the expiration of the HEAR Act, states must address important 
questions regarding the trajectory of statute of limitations rules for Nazi-
confiscated art.  This part argues that:  (1) the HEAR Act invites state 
legislation implementing the demand and refusal rule; (2) the rule should be 
applied to all stolen chattels upon expiration of the HEAR Act; (3) the rule 
should extend to thieves and bad-faith purchasers, not just good-faith 
purchasers; (4) the rule should not be applied retroactively; and (5) states 
should shorten the duration of statutes of limitations upon implementing 
demand and refusal. 
A.  The HEAR Act Invites State Legislation Implementing the Demand and 
Refusal Rule 
When the HEAR Act expires, discovery-rule states should adopt the 
demand and refusal rule.  The HEAR Act, while predicated on “actual 
discovery,” adopts a rule that is actually more similar to the demand and 
refusal rule than to the discovery rule.183  The HEAR Act, by addressing the 
immorality of Nazi-confiscation of artwork and the unfairness of statutory 
bars to recovery, should be a model for states of the need for more claimant-
friendly rules affecting stolen personal property.  Therefore, this section 
 
Lazerow, supra note 162, at 258 (noting that “any attempt to apply HEAR to lengthen the 
statute of limitations for those properties” where good title was acquired by adverse possession 
“would be an unconstitutional taking of the property barred by the Fifth Amendment”).  The 
Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part:  “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 179. 115 U.S. 620 (1885). 
 180. Cunningham, supra note 178, at 453–54 (quoting Campbell, 115 U.S. at 623). 
 181. See id. at 455. 
 182. See id. at 453–55; infra Part III.D; see also Dowd Email, supra note 150 (“The 
constitutional problem for any proposal is passing a law that appears to be a taking of 
property.”). 
 183. Contra Alexander Hull, Note, Shoring up the HEAR Act:  Proposed Amendments to 
Federal Legislation Designed to Assist Heirs and Claimants of Nazi-Looted Art, 28 J.L. & 
POL’Y 238, 267–71 (2019) (calling the HEAR Act a discovery rule). 
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argues that states that currently follow the discovery rule should learn from 
the HEAR Act and recognize the need for an independent, yet uniform, 
switch to the demand and refusal rule. 
1.  The Goals of the HEAR Act Are Most in Line with the Demand and 
Refusal Rule 
The “Findings” and “Purposes” sections of the HEAR Act indicate that the 
Act is designed to ensure that meritorious claims are not unjustly barred by 
restrictive statutes of limitations.184  Thus, as the purpose of the HEAR Act 
is claimant friendliness,185 a shift away from discovery (i.e., actual or 
constructive discovery) and toward demand and refusal is ultimately 
necessary.  Since the demand and refusal rule provides the longest time for 
claimants to recover their items, and since laches shifts the burden of proof 
for diligence onto the defendant,186 the demand and refusal rule’s claimant 
friendliness is most in line with the stated goals and purposes of the HEAR 
Act.  Thus, upon expiration of the Act, states should adopt the demand and 
refusal rule. 
2.  “Actual Discovery” Is More Like Demand and Refusal than Discovery 
While the HEAR Act has been described as adopting a discovery rule,187 
this Note argues that “actual discovery,” as used in the HEAR Act, is more 
analogous to demand and refusal than it is to discovery.  The description of 
the HEAR Act as creating a discovery rule has some credibility given that 
the HEAR Act is predicated on “actual discovery.”188  However, in practice, 
actual discovery is more similar in its use and application to demand and 
refusal than to discovery.  Thus, states should see the HEAR Act’s rule as an 
invitation to shift to a demand and refusal rule. 
In a case brought under the HEAR Act, once a potential claimant has actual 
knowledge, his lack of due diligence in instituting a suit may still jeopardize 
his claim under laches.189  Similarly, under the demand and refusal rule, if a 
claimant, after actual discovery, does not send a demand in a reasonable time 
so as to avoid prejudice to the defendant, the claim will be barred by 
laches.190  In both instances, once the claimant knows where the item is, the 
claimant must either demand the item’s return from the possessor or bring a 
suit.  Additionally, once the claimant has made a demand and received a 
refusal, there is no reason not to immediately bring a suit for return of the 
 
 184. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 §§ 2–3, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note. 
 185. Dowd has suggested that the law of decedents, “an area that is [also] governed by state 
law,” is similarly claimant friendly.  Thus, there is evidence that state law is, and should be, 
generally claimant friendly. Dowd Email, supra note 150. 
 186. See supra Parts I.E, II.B. 
 187. See Hull, supra note 183, at 267–71. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See generally Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019); 
supra notes 100–18 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra Part I.E. 
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item.  In that sense, initiating suit upon demand and refusal and bringing suit 
upon actual discovery become nearly synonymous in practice.  In either case, 
to avoid being barred under laches, the claimant must act by either 
demanding the return of the property or filing suit upon actual knowledge.  
The facts of O’Keeffe (although the court employed the discovery rule) 
illustrate that actual discovery is, in practice, temporally similar to demand 
and refusal.191  O’Keeffe actually discovered the location of her paintings in 
September 1975, demanded their return—which was refused by Snyder—
and ultimately filed her complaint in March 1976.192  In the span of a mere 
six months, actual discovery and demand and refusal were made.193 
Dissimilarly, in a discovery-rule jurisdiction, “constructive discovery,” or 
the time when one should have known the whereabouts of one’s item, may 
be very far off from actual discovery, a demand, and the commencement of 
a lawsuit.  Since constructive discovery is merely a hypothetical fiction,194 
the time difference between constructive discovery and a demand/suit may 
be substantial.  For example, perhaps O’Keeffe, had she been diligently 
searching for her paintings, should have known the whereabouts of her 
paintings long before she actually discovered them.195  Thus, the HEAR 
Act’s “actual discovery” requirement is more temporally similar to demand 
and refusal than it is to constructive discovery under the discovery rule.  
Therefore, in learning from the HEAR Act, states should seek to adopt a 
demand and refusal rule upon the HEAR Act’s expiration. 
3.  Applicability of Laches in Zuckerman Promotes Demand and Refusal 
Plus Laches 
The Second Circuit’s application of the doctrine of laches to actions 
brought under the HEAR Act is evidence that courts,196 in addition to 
Congress, recognize that the HEAR Act’s rule is more analogous to the 
demand and refusal rule.  The Second Circuit extensively discussed the 
legislative history of the HEAR Act to determine that equitable defenses such 
as laches were meant to be applicable under the HEAR Act.197  Once again, 
states should thus learn from the HEAR Act that the best way to incorporate 
due diligence in art restitution cases is through a laches defense, rather than 
through a discovery rule. 
Critics of this idea would likely claim that the demand and refusal plus 
laches rule should not be adopted because laches defenses are often 
 
 191. See generally O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980). 
 192. Id. at 864–66. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See Dowd Email, supra note 150. 
 195. See generally O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 862. 
 196. See generally Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 197. See id. at 196–97; supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text.  Note that laches could 
technically still apply to a case in a discovery rule jurisdiction.  However, this Note argues 
that the due diligence importance that laches holds in demand and refusal rule jurisdictions 
closely ties laches and the demand and refusal rule. 
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unsuccessful.198  However, Zuckerman illustrates plainly that courts will find 
laches defenses successful under the HEAR Act where appropriate.199  Thus, 
the fear of widespread, unsuccessful laches claims, even where warranted, is 
not a concern under the HEAR Act and should not dissuade states from 
adopting demand and refusal rules. 
4.  The HEAR Act Intentionally Keeps the Demand and Refusal Rule in 
Place 
The sunset provision in the HEAR Act ensures the continuation of the 
demand and refusal rule.200  Upon expiration of the HEAR Act, “a claimant, 
who for whatever reason could not or did not want to bring a claim under the 
HEAR Act, may still be able to bring a claim under New York’s demand and 
refusal rule.”201  Put differently, “the sunset provision preserves New York’s 
demand and refusal rule, but delays its potential invocation until January 1, 
2027.”202 
However, those that note the preservation of the demand and refusal rule 
ignore the potential intentionality behind leaving the rule in place.  Jason 
Barnes, for example, simply notes the existence of this caveat—calling it “a 
one-way ratchet in favor of claimants.”203  Though Barnes cites the Senate 
subcommittee testimony of Agnes Peresztegi, president of the Commission 
for Art Recovery—noting that the HEAR Act should not supplant “statute of 
limitation rules more favorable to claimants”—he fails to tackle head-on the 
idea that, in allowing this caveat to exist, Congress had, in essence, endorsed 
the demand and refusal rule.204 
Simon Frankel and Sari Sharoni concur that the HEAR Act preserves New 
York’s demand and refusal rule.205  They state that, “[p]erhaps, for claims 
arising on or after the Act’s enactment, a New York claimant potentially has 
two bites at the apple.”206  However, where Barnes fails to address the 
intentionality behind this preservation of the demand and refusal rule, 
Frankel and Sharoni rightfully highlight it: 
This appears consistent with the Act’s legislative history, which states, 
“[n]othing, however, bars the claimant from asserting claims that remain 
timely under applicable State law.”  And, arguably, an implicit purpose of 
 
 198. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 199. See generally Zuckerman, 928 F.3d 186. 
 200. See Barnes, supra note 60, at 632–33. 
 201. Id. at 633. 
 202. Hull, supra note 183, at 270; see also Lazerow, supra note 162, at 257 (stating that 
the HEAR Act “will have little effect in New York, the most popular state for litigating 
Holocaust recovery cases”). 
 203. Barnes, supra note 60, at 633. 
 204. See id. at 612 (quoting HEAR Act Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Agnes 
Peresztegi, President, Commission for Art Recovery)).  Note that laches would still apply to a 
claimant who tries to file a claim under New York’s demand and refusal rule after the HEAR 
Act expires. 
 205. See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 95, at 173. 
 206. Id. 
2866 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
the Act is to extend existing state limitations periods, rather than constrain 
them in some way. . . . 
[Thus], the language used by Congress seems significant and should be 
given effect.207 
Finally, Frankel and Sharoni note Congress’s use of “may” rather than 
“shall,” for the purposes of commencing an action under the HEAR Act, as 
evidence that Congress wanted to preserve state statutes already more 
favorable to claimants.208 
Despite the likely intentionality by Congress, the preservation of the 
demand and refusal rule has been called “a nonsensical result that rewards or 
at least allows claimants to wait before bringing claims.”209  “This runs 
contrary to the sensible policy rationale at the heart of laches, which is to 
avoid prejudice and unreasonable delay in bringing claims.”210  However, 
this argument against the preservation of the demand and refusal rule fails 
because it muddles the policy implications of laches and the application of 
laches.  Where the demand and refusal rule remains, laches still applies; the 
preservation of the demand and refusal rule cannot run counter to the policy 
rationale of laches because the demand and refusal rule employs laches as a 
possible defense.211  Furthermore, the preservation of the demand and refusal 
rule in no way “rewards” a claimant who delays bringing a claim because a 
laches defense still imposes a due diligence requirement.212  Any claim that 
is brought under New York’s demand and refusal rule after January 1, 2027, 
would still be barred by laches if unreasonably delayed to the prejudice of 
the defendant.213  Thus, it is likely that Congress intentionally left the 
demand and refusal rule in place—relying on laches to bar unreasonably 
delayed claims. 
5.  State Implementation to Avoid Unconstitutionality Concerns 
While it has been suggested that Congress could alternatively “replac[e] 
the discovery rule with New York’s demand and refusal rule, thereby making 
it so that this claimant-friendly rule preempts each state’s statute of 
limitations in the Nazi-looted art context, without a sunset provision,”214 
such a solution is flawed.  Instead, states, rather than Congress, should 
implement demand and refusal rules on their own—thereby promoting 
ultimate art restitution and preserving due diligence through laches, all the 
while allowing statutes of limitations to remain a power of the states.  
 
 207. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 10 (2016)). 
 208. Id. at 173–74. 
 209. Hull, supra note 183, at 270. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See supra Part I.E. 
 212. See supra Part I.E. 
 213. See supra Part I.E. 
 214. Hull, supra note 183, at 271. 
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Importantly, this suggestion of state implementation avoids Charron’s 
unconstitutionality argument.215 
Prior iterations of the HEAR Act and its revisions, as well as the final 
version of the HEAR Act, indicate that Congress is apprehensive about 
remaining in this area of the law for too long; an earlier version of the bill 
stated that “the enactment of a Federal law is the best way to ensure that 
claims to Nazi-confiscated art are adjudicated,” while the final version of the 
Act stated that “the enactment of a Federal law is necessary to ensure that 
claims to Nazi-confiscated art are adjudicated.”216  This change in language 
may indicate Congress’s intent to remove itself from this area once the issue 
has been addressed—remaining only as long as is needed to bring the issue 
to the states’ attention. 
Furthermore, the better argument regarding Congress’s intention not to 
involve itself perpetually in this area lies in the text of the HEAR Act itself.  
The inclusion of the sunset provision217 demonstrates clear congressional 
intent to not eternally involve itself in this area of the law.  While Barnes, for 
example, argues that Congress cites Von Saher I in the HEAR Act “as if to 
blame the HEAR Act, and its erosion of state sovereignty, on the Judiciary,” 
the HEAR Act does not “ero[de] . . . state sovereignty” simply because it 
contains a sunset provision.218  If Congress truly intended to overtake the 
power of states to determine statute of limitations rules on Nazi-confiscated 
art, it could have ensured that the Act endured.219 
A number of other federal responses to the HEAR Act have been 
suggested.220  For example, “Congress could have passed legislation that 
would have allowed or encouraged states to establish alternative procedures 
for restitution claims for art lost during the Nazi era.”221  However, this 
alternative would merely duplicate the work the HEAR Act is already doing.  
The HEAR Act, and its inclusion of a sunset provision, encourages states to 
recognize that the discovery rule is not the most effective way to protect 
stolen art and thus further encourages states to adopt the demand and refusal 
rule.  Congress then included the sunset provision so that, at the end of this 
 
 215. See supra Part II.C.  Alexander Hull’s student note, in contrast to this Note, suggests 
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strong a response. See Dowd Email, supra note 150. 
 216. Compare Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong. 
§ 2(7) (as reported in Senate, Sept. 29, 2016) (emphasis added), with Holocaust Expropriated 
Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2(7), 130 Stat. 1524, 1525 (codified at 22 
U.S.C. § 1621 note) (emphasis added). 
 217. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(g), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note. 
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“test period,” states could, on their own, implement rules closer to the 
demand and refusal rule.222 
Therefore, it appears that Congress specifically included the sunset 
provision in the HEAR Act to indicate its apprehension about involving itself 
too heavily in an otherwise state-law-dominated area.223  The sunset 
provision has the precise purpose of ending federal power in this area and 
returning the power to the states.224 
B.  Application to All Stolen Chattels to Avoid Von Saher I 
States that adopt a demand and refusal rule should further apply that rule 
to all stolen chattels, not just Nazi-confiscated art.225  This expansion of the 
rule would avoid the holding in Von Saher I226 and expand claimant-
friendliness to cases of any stolen personal property.227 
The demand and refusal rule adopted by states can be applied to all stolen 
chattels to avoid the holding in Von Saher I that states cannot create 
exceptions to their statutes of limitations for Nazi-confiscated art because 
doing so infringes on Congress’s foreign affairs power.228  By applying the 
rule to all chattels, no such exception would exist. 
While some have suggested that the holding in Von Saher I was wrongly 
decided,229 mere application to all chattels, not just Nazi-confiscated art, 
would avoid that conflict.  Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress disagreed 
with the holding in Von Saher I230 because Congress positively cited the case 
in the HEAR Act.231  More likely, Congress’s citation to Von Saher I was an 
underwrite of, or congressional concurrence with, its holding.  This Note’s 
suggestion to broaden the rule to all stolen chattels would avoid the issues 
that arise under Von Saher I and the suggestions of those who find its holding 
erroneous.232 
Lastly, the application of the rule to all stolen chattels, not just Nazi-
confiscated art, would ensure that claimant friendliness is provided in any 
case of a stolen item; such a rule would mean that no more importance is 
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placed on a stolen Picasso than on the stuffed bear your grandmother gave 
you as a child.233  While it can be suggested that the rule should apply only 
to “unique chattels,”234 states should not draw lines of demarcation based on 
personal value and sentimentality. 
C.  Application of Demand and Refusal to Thieves and Bad-Faith 
Purchasers 
One of the most startling concerns about the demand and refusal rule is 
that it appears to treat thieves and bad-faith purchasers better than it treats 
good-faith purchasers.235  In Lubell, the court applied demand and refusal to 
the oft-encountered case of a demand for return of an object held by a good-
faith purchaser—nonetheless noting the “seemingly anomalous” result that 
by applying demand and refusal only to good-faith purchasers, “a different 
rule applies when the stolen object is in the possession of the thief.  In that 
situation, the Statute of Limitations runs from the time of the theft.”236  This 
notion defies logic and basic senses of morality; thus, upon implementing a 
demand and refusal rule, states should apply it beyond just good-faith 
purchasers, to provide ultimate claimant friendliness irrespective of who is 
in possession of the item.237  The application of demand and refusal to thieves 
and bad-faith purchasers, in addition to good-faith purchasers, would 
effectuate ultimate claimant friendliness in all situations of stolen goods.  Not 
only would the type of chattel not impede an original owner’s right to recover 
the item, but the type of possessor would also not change the original owner’s 
rights as against the possessor. 
D.  Nonretroactivity of Newly Implemented Demand and Refusal Rules to 
Avoid Fifth Amendment Concerns 
Upon implementing the demand and refusal rule for all chattels and 
applying it to all possessors, states should classify the statute as purely 
prospective238—that is, the statute should not apply to a possessor who has 
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2870 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
already acquired title under a preexisting statute but would not yet hold title 
under the new statute.  Put otherwise, the new statute should not revive 
actions that were previously barred by the old statute. 
A hypothetical can illustrate where this might occur.  Suppose a thief (T) 
steals a painting from an owner (O) in a demand and refusal jurisdiction.  The 
applicable statute of limitations is three years.  T holds on to the painting for 
three years.  After three years, the jurisdiction adopts this Note’s proposed 
statute—including the provision that demand and refusal applies to thieves 
and bad-faith purchasers.  Under this new rule, O demands the painting’s 
return from T, and T refuses.  O subsequently brings a suit for the painting, 
claiming that the statute began to run when O demanded the painting and T 
refused.  T argues that the statute began to run at the time of the theft and so 
he has already acquired good title.  Since the statute has run, the new statute 
should not apply to divest T’s title. 
To avoid any Fifth Amendment concerns of unconstitutional takings of 
property,239 this Note suggests that where any statute of limitations for 
replevin has run on an item in the hands of a subsequent possessor, and thus 
the subsequent possessor has acquired good title, newly implemented 
demand and refusal rules should not resurrect the original owner’s previously 
barred cause of action. 
E.  Shortening the Statute of Limitations Duration 
New York’s statute of limitations duration for a cause of action for 
replevin is three years.240  New Jersey’s statute is six years.241  In reality, 
where a demand and refusal rule is used, there is no need to have such lengthy 
statutes of limitations.  Upon formal demand and refusal, both parties are on 
notice of the potential for a lawsuit, and the suit can and should be brought 
immediately upon formal refusal.242  Shortening the duration of the statute 
of limitations following formal refusal would serve the purpose of preventing 
stale claims, lost evidence, and faded memories,243 without compromising 
the demand and refusal rule’s goal of claimant friendliness. 
A number of cases illustrate that a long duration between demand and 
refusal and filing suit is practically unnecessary and that such a lengthy 
duration only serves to allow for the type of unreasonable delay that laches 
seeks to avoid.244  For example, in Lubell, demand for the artwork’s return 
was made on January 9, 1986, and the action was commenced on September 
28, 1987.245  In O’Keeffe, although the discovery rule was employed, 
O’Keeffe made a demand for the painting after discovering its location in 
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September 1975 and its possessor in February 1976; she subsequently filed 
suit in March of 1976.246  In Reif v. Nagy,247 plaintiff was put on notice by 
the defendant’s attorney via email on November 13, 2015, and the complaint 
was filed in March 2016.248  Therefore, there is no practical reason to have a 
lengthy statute of limitations in a demand and refusal jurisdiction when suits 
can and should be filed almost immediately following receipt of refusal. 
Furthermore, since statutes of limitations were established before these 
accrual rules were set in place,249 the legislature is free to adjust these 
durations once accrual rules are defined.  Thus, legislatures, upon adopting 
this Note’s proposed demand and refusal rule, should additionally shorten the 
duration of statutes to promote expediency—and doing so would not really 
change the practices of claimants. 
Finally, lengthy statutes of limitations are only necessary where the 
running of the statute of limitations is predicated on constructive discovery 
rather than demand and refusal—such an expansive duration allows “wiggle 
room” for the uncertainty of constructive discovery250 but would not be 
needed where a bright-line demand and refusal rule is used.  Where a state is 
apprehensive about implementing the demand and refusal rule for fear it will 
not result in expeditious filing of claims, both the doctrine of laches and a 
shortened statute of limitations can be employed. 
CONCLUSION 
Of the 600,000 works of art taken by Nazis under Hitler’s regime, only 
100,000 works have been recovered.251  Due to the difficulties that arise in 
tracking these works down, Congress passed the HEAR Act to effectuate the 
long overdue recovery of stolen Jewish property.252  However, the HEAR 
Act’s claimant friendliness should serve as a lesson to states of the need for 
rules that effectuate recovery of all stolen property.  Nazi-confiscated 
artwork is a striking and necessary example of the need for a nationwide shift 
toward more claimant-friendly rules for recovery of all stolen personal 
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property.  Thus, upon the expiration of the HEAR Act, states should evaluate 
their statutes of limitations for replevin and adopt the claimant-friendly 
demand and refusal rule.  In adopting this rule, states should implement the 
following principles.  States should apply this rule to all stolen chattels, not 
just Nazi-confiscated artwork, and should apply this rule to thieves and bad-
faith purchasers, not just good-faith purchasers.  Such an application would 
allow for ultimate claimant friendliness and the recovery of more stolen 
chattels.  Further, application of the doctrine of laches could weed out any 
nonmeritorious claims.  To avoid any unconstitutional takings where title has 
already vested under a previous statute, this rule should not be applied 
retroactively.  Finally, the duration of the statute of limitations should be 
shortened to ensure expeditious filing of claims. 
